DAO-book. Appendix No. 03. Governance tokens and other control quirks
Now almost 99% of DAOs are trying to introduce governance tokens, but few people ask the question: “Why?”. Even less – knows, but what’s the problem of these assets. Let’s try to figure it out briefly.
Previous parts
- Part I. Introduction, concept, classification;
- Part II. Platforms for DAOS;
- Part III. How to become part of Tao;
- Appendix No. 01. Future work;
- Appendix No. 02. Full -fledged Tao .
Bitcoin and voting useful action
And although the search for nonCE in a scientific language can be recognized as useless, still the salt is that miners and complete nodes are multidirectional participants Network Bitcoin , which, when BTC mining, becomes a full -fledged DAO, perform precisely useful work for the entire community.
And, notice: without any tokens Voting! Why?
- If you need Fork (software/hard) and/or updating a different plan, then the process is simple: you are supported – install the right version by. Let’s say it was with Segwit;
- If you need a discussion – There is a standard forum and communication through the repository commits and you do not need to come up with anything: all the more so in Core.Bitcoin decentralization issues work perfectly;
- Finally, if something insignificant happens, then why take it off as much as a vote?
Therefore, Bitcoin-QAK-Dao has been working for more than 13 years and excellent: the result is always the code adopted by miners through the indirect installation of software and widespread in the same network as an opinion through complete/other nodes.
And the process with Segvit is very indicative. I quote: “Thus, today most miners have not decided which side they are going to accept, and the activation of Segwit can drag out until next year or not take place at all. SEGWIT is directly supported by 26% of miners, and its obvious opponents have 11% of the network (excluding the BW Pool, which did not speak out against Segwit despite the fact that it votes for 8MB block). But even 11% is enough to freeze the activation up to its cancellation in a year. Let’s say more – even having one enemy in the person of Viabtc, Segwit will not be able to gain a majority of 95%if the share of this pool does not fall due to the outflow of miners or for other reasons ”. This is for 2016. Now the data is already in a historical context:
As you can see, the process was quite natural. Why? Because it was stretched in time during which miners could evaluate the pros and cons of. And in this I see the main plus of this approach: you can accept critical updates that are important for miners and other network participants quickly; and strategic solutions do not comment.
VIZ and the committee
And although Viz himself is not the largest solution to Graphene (Bitshares) of the family, he has a number of undeniable advantages in comparison with the Bitshars themselves, EOS, Steem, Golos and other.
Firstly, a consensus based on Fair dpos: what and why this can be read in a separate material . Secondly, there is not a mandatory, but desirable element of internal counseling . Thirdly, there is an internal committee that just considers/is collecting applications: https: // Control.viz.World/Committee/ . In this case, the process occurs, as a rule, in the reverse order: 1) first, the active participant does something useful and evaluates the Viz made in native tokens; 2) then the committee decides whether the assessment is adequate and whether the declared is made.
At the same time, in the committee, everyone can vote on the percentage that he considers necessary: it depends on the internal assessment of the initiator of the application application.
Dao Envelop: Super-Dao & Micro-daos
This model is still easier:
- There are tokens (Niftsy and/or any approved partnership interchangeable tokens);
- There is a threshold of entry into a pool of applications (from 100 niftsy on the account should be today); -to avoid spam applications;
- There is a min amount of participation (today-10,000 niftsy): in order to introduce more or less equal conditions;
- There is a max contribution amount (depends on the type/type and other characteristics of Micro-DaOS, but usually at least +30% of the min): in order to increase the initial level of decentralization;
- There is a form of approval: I liked it – you make a fee: in this case, the contribution can be either through tokens and through liquidity;
- And there are principles for the input of micro-dao in White-List:
- Primary verification (moderation) with a community/team is necessary;
- Description in the established form;
- Roadmap with the stages of creating a product and defrosting tokens, respectively;
- Contacts for feedback;
This is also a vote by action, but already 100% financial. Want? Choose, make, get payments. Do not want? You can stand in line (pharmacing) and/or hodl-toe tokens.
At the same time, the voting stage is simplified, since the created tool-the Envelop protocol allows you to freeze liquidity/tokens through WRAP-NFT as it was described in. Butaterin in the DAICO approach: 1) by stages (approved stages); 2) according to the decision of the Tao on defrosting/freezing. Have not reached the release? So the project will only receive payments on MVP, Alfa, Beta.
Dao Metago & NFT-key
Also quite simple mechanics:
- If you want to be a participant in DAO? You connect to the circle No. 02 or No. 03 (the difference between in them in different responsibilities) and start working;
- At the same time, the circle No. 03 is available for NFT-in-Queen-Bulet: I purchased, entered the closed chat, you can start working for the benefit of Tao.
In this case, three categories (roles) of participants arise:
- Founders (initial organizers);
- Events organizers;
- Craytors (Creators);
- Circle participants No. 03;
- Observers (participants in the general chat);
- Other participants.
In fact, everything is decided by Ad HOC: There is a NFT key? Create an event from DAO indicating the distribution of interest: so much-to co-organizers, assistants, speakers; So much-to yourself; so much (at least 10% income)-in the DAO fund.
Again: a bezed vote is possible, but its meaning is only in duplication of actions that are happening in chats, so in fact it is removed here as an extra and unknown link.
But what is the problem of governance-tokens?
Perhaps the time has come to answer this question:
- Users who specify on any control tokens, as a rule, do not participate in the development of the protocol, ecosystems, individual services, but make money on them due to speculation;
- Often there is also double speculation: a) a person takes a question that is interesting to him; b) buy tokens in the market, knowing that they can jump in price during the voting process; c) votes; d) throws away tokens at an inflated price. As a result, it does not bring any benefit to anyone except the speculator;
- Finally, the author of the analysis indicated above by the link, just proposed the concept of “governance-mining”, which involves the reward of those who invest in the development of the protocol.
Therefore, it is not at all necessary to follow the trend during the “registration” of the Tao, creating standard ERC-20-like tokens, control tokens, etc.D. This is possible, but not necessarily: after all, excess models are good when it is clear where and how exactly this very excess will be spent. In other cases, this causes more harm than benefits.
Hitter
In fact, today, in 2022, we are at the final stage of the secondary formation of the DAOS market:
- The first stage-2009-2016., That is, until the creation of The DAO, when the main problems, advantages and prospects of decentralized autonomous organizations were formulated;
- The second stage – 2016 – 2022., когда появились платформы для ДАО, общие подходы к документации, управлению казной и т.D.;
- The third stage is https://gagarin.news/ 2023 and up to 2030, when the Tao will become an integral part of the crypto-offshore. And at this moment their growth is expected by exponent.
Therefore, the approach to optimizing voting and making a decision is important. In addition, the democratic principle of the majority and the oligarchic principle of capital pressure (POS) is poorly affected by the reputation of the systems and most importantly – their decentralization, so we will return to these moments, but for now everything and all
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